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This chapter discusses the evolution in jurisprudential understanding of the 
relationship between copyright and freedom of artistic expression in the 
European Union. It demonstrates how courts in France and several other EU 
member states have accepted a “fair use” approach that applies fundamental 
rights as external limitations to copyright law, in compliance with the case law 
of the European Court of Human Rights but contrasting with the recent 
conflicting position of the Court of Justice of the European Union. The chapter 
first analyses the application of freedom of artistic expression to copyright law 
on a case-by-case basis and shows that, although long contested, such an 
approach is now mandated by EU primary law, thus “flexibilizing” significantly 
the legal framework in this area. It then examines the balancing act between 
fundamental rights and copyright, with particular attention paid to the weight 
the judiciary should afford freedom of artistic expression versus copyright law 
in cases of creative appropriation, in order to comply with the obligations 
resulting from European, national, and international human rights provisions. 
Finally, the chapter concludes with a discussion and evaluation of the growing 
need for legislative reform to render freedom of artistic expression fully 
compatible with copyright law in the context of creative reuses of protected 
works.  
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INTRODUCTION 
It is often assumed that an open-ended limitation to copyright, such as the 
fair use defense, is alien to the civil law tradition as it gives too much power to 
judges to design the contours of copyright law on a case-by-case basis. 1 
However, the increasing use of fundamental rights in copyright disputes in 
many civil law countries is challenging that assumption, raising the question of 
whether a sort of “fair use” limitation is not already being wielded through the 
weighing of interests and use of the proportionality test, both of which are 
required when the judiciary is applying fundamental rights.2 It will be shown in 
this chapter that even in France, traditionally considered an exemplar of civil 
                                                 
1 P. Bernt Hugenholtz & Martin R.F. Senftleben, Fair Use in Europe: In Search of 
Flexibilities 4 (Amsterdam Law Sch. Research Paper No. 2012-39; Inst. for Info. Law 
Research Paper No. 2012-33, 2012) (“[F]air use in Europe is often regarded as an 
oxymoron or even a taboo in classic author’s rights doctrine.”). 
2 Already advocating that the use of fundamental rights opens up the closed list of 
statutory limitations through the use of the proportionality requirement, creating an 
open ended limitation to copyright law, see CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, DROIT D'AUTEUR ET 
DROIT DU PUBLIC À L'INFORMATION, APPROCHE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 391 (2004). For 
further discussion about the principle of proportionality and its consequences, see Jonas 
Christoffersen, Human Rights and Balancing: The Principle of Proportionality, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 19, 19-39 
(Christophe Geiger ed., 2015); Orit Fischman Afori, Proportionality – A New Mega 
Standard in European Copyright Law, 45 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION 
L. 889 (2014); Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Intellectual Property before the 
European Court of Human Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY 9 
(Christophe Geiger et al. eds., 2018); Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Shaping 
Intellectual Property Rights through Human Rights Adjudication: The Example of the 
European Court of Human Rights, 46 MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 527 (2020).. 
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law reasoning in copyright matters, a recent and highly commented-upon 
decision of the French Supreme Court concerning the balancing of freedom of 
artistic expression with copyright has paved the way for a judicial in concreto 
assessment of copyright limitations.3 This change in approach by the courts can 
be witnessed not only in France but also in many other civil law jurisdictions 
across Europe, 4  and even by  the Court of Justice of the European Union 
(CJEU),5 thus strengthening the argument for the introduction of an open clause 
for limitations in EU copyright law.6 
In fact, important rulings often result from concrete and simple situations to 
which judges are required to respond as appropriately and fairly as possible. In 
this context, the judiciary is increasingly playing a crucial role in the intellectual 
property arena, allowing the legislative framework to adapt to both 
                                                 
3 Cour de Cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] 1e civ., May 15, 2015, 
Bull. Civ. 1, No. 13/27391 (Fr.). Discussing this case and the recent case law in France 
with regard creative appropriations, see also Christophe Geiger, Appropriation créative 
et droit d’auteur, Réflexions sur les évolutions récentes de la jurisprudence française à 
la lumière du droit de l’Union et du droit comparé, in MELANGES EN L’HONNEUR DU 
PROFESSEUR CLAUDE WITZ 327-347 (2018). 
4  See generally Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Copyright on the Human 
Rights Trial: Redefining the Boundaries of Exclusivity through Freedom of Expression, 
45 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 316 (2014). See also infra Parts I and 
II. 
5 The cases are too numerous to be cited here. For further references, see Christophe 
Geiger, The Role of the Court of Justice of the European Union: Harmonizing, Creating 
and sometimes Disrupting Copyright Law in the European Union, in NEW 
DEVELOPMENTS IN EU AND INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW 435 (Irini Stamatoudi 
ed., 2016); Jonathan Griffiths, Taking Power Tools to the Acquis – The Court of Justice, 
The Charter of Fundamental Rights and European Union Copyright Law, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE JUDICIARY, supra note 2, at 144; Stijn van Deursen 
and Thom Snijders, The Court of Justice at the Crossroads: Clarifying the Role for 
Fundamental Rights in the EU Copyright Framework, 49 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 1080 (2018). The importance of fundamental rights when interpreting 
EU copyright law has been reiterated by the CJEU in a trilogy of decisions rendered on 
29 July 2019, Funke Medien NRW GmbH v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C-469/17; 
Pelham GmbH and Others v. Ralf Hütter and Florian Schneider-Esleben, C-476/17; 
and CJEU, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Volker Beck, C‑516/17, excluding however that 
fundamental rights can serve as external limitations when none of the existing 
exceptions are applicable (see infra Fn. 8).  
6 Calling for the introducing of an open ended limitation in EU copyright law, see, e.g., 
Martin Senftleben, The Perfect Match – Civil Law Judges and Open-Ended Fair Use 
Provisions, 33 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 231 (2017); P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Flexible 
Copyright: Can EU Author’s Rights Accommodate Fair Use?, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS 
IN EU AND INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHT LAW, supra note 5, at 417; Christophe Geiger, 
Flexibilising Copyright – Remedies to the Privatisation of Information by Copyright 
Law, 39 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 178 (2008);  Martin Senftleben, 
Comparative Approaches to Fair Use: An Important Impulse for Reforms in EU 
Copyright Law, in METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 30 
(Graeme Dinwoodie ed., 2014); Hugenholtz & Senftleben, supra note 1; Christophe 
Geiger et al., The EU Commission’s Proposal to Reform Copyright Limitations: A 
Good but Far Too Timid Step in the Right Direction, 40 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 4 
(2018). 
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technological developments and new social and economic practices.7 At a time 
when legislative solutions are very slow to emerge, and often manifest difficult 
compromises, the courts can allow a legal field to develop by proposing 
innovative solutions that amount to a break with established practices. This was 
certainly the case with the groundbreaking ruling rendered by the French 
Supreme Court on May 15, 2015 in Klasen v. Malka addressing the relationship 
between copyright and freedom of artistic expression. That decision constitutes 
the point of departure for this chapter, as it is symptomatic of a larger trend in 
civil law countries to legitimize creative uses based on fundamental rights 
beyond those allowed by statutory limitations to copyright law8.  
The facts of the case are as follows. The painter Peter Klasen incorporated 
into his paintings three photographs from an Italian fashion journal showing the 
face of a young model after coloring them blue. Klasen’s process is relatively 
banal for anyone familiar with the artistic movements of the past 40 or 50 years, 
in which collages incorporating a range of uses and re-workings of famous 
trademarks, consumer objects, advertising, fictional characters, and popular 
works are legion.9 In fact, many artists make frequent use of such a process, 
                                                 
7 On the role of the judiciary in IP law, see the various chapters in Ch. Geiger, C. A. 
Nard and X. Seuba (eds.), Intellectual Property and the Judiciary, supra note 2, in 
particular the introduction to the volume p. 1 sq. 
8 This approach has been explicitly endorsed by the Advocate General (AG) of the 
Court of Justice of the European Union. In his Opinion in Case C-469/17, Funke 
Medien NRW GmbH v. Federal Republic of Germany, delivered on 25 October 2018 
(EU:C:2018:870), AG Szpunar considered that there are circumstances when the 
exclusive rights “must yield to an overriding interest relating to the implementation of 
a fundamental right or freedom” – an explicit admittance (for the first time at EU level) 
of the admissibility of an external limitation to copyright by freedom of expression [at 
40]. In his two subsequent Opinions in the “Pelham” and “Spiegel Online” cases, 
dealing with the question of the admissibility of an external freedom of expression-
limitation beyond the list of codified exceptions in EU Copyright law, the AG specified 
that there is such an “exceptional circumstance” when the “essence of a fundamental 
rights” is at stake. See Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in Case C-476/17, Pelham 
and Others, delivered on 12 December 2018, EU:C:2018:1002, [94]; and Opinion of 
Advocate General Szpunar in Case C‑516/17, Spiegel Online, delivered on 10 January 
2019, EU:C:2019:16, [62]. On these Opinions, see Christophe Geiger & Elena 
Izyumenko, Freedom of expression as an external limitation to copyright law in the 
EU: The Advocate General of the CJEU shows the way, 41 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 
131 (2019); unfortunately, however, the CJEU in these cases decided not to follow the 
AG on this point. Despite showing a favorable position to the possibility of interpreting 
EU copyright in the light of fundamental rights norms, the Luxembourg court 
considered in fact that is not possible to go beyond the exhaustive list of limitations by 
using an external freedom of expression-exception (CJEU, Funke Medien NRW GmbH 
v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, C-469/17, 29 July 2019, EU:C:2019:623 (“Funke 
Medien”, at para. 64); CJEU, Pelham GmbH and Others v. Ralf Hütter and Florian 
Schneider-Esleben, C-476/17, 29 July 2019, EU:C:2019:624 (“Pelham”, at para. 65); 
and CJEU, Spiegel Online GmbH v. Volker Beck, C‑516/17, 29 July 2019, 
EU:C:2019:625 (“Spiegel Online”, at para. 49). On these very important decisions see 
Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, The Constitutionalization of Intellectual 
Property Law in the E.U. and the Funke Medien, Pelham and Spiegel Online Decisions 
of the CJEU: Progress, But Still Some Way to Go!, 51 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 282 (2020). 
9 On these artistic movements, see, e.g., IRVING SANDLER, ART OF THE POSTMODERN 
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primarily by reworking elements protected by intellectual property rights 
(copyright, trademark, or designs rights) for the purpose of criticism or homage, 
their aim being to trigger artistic reflection on society and its current icons.10 
Appropriation plays a central role in the modern and contemporary art 
movements, even if original works are sometimes modified or transformed. 
Fortunately, most creative appropriations are not subject to copyright 
infringement litigation11 because, given their frequency, such litigation would 
likely lead to seizure of the contemporary art collections of many of the world’s 
major museums.12 
However, such cases occasionally end up before the courts, usually when 
two factors are present, sometimes in combination. The first is extrinsically 
linked to the success of the derivative work in question. If it is successful, the 
author of the appropriated work is likely to consider him or herself legitimately 
                                                 
ERA: FROM THE LATE 1960S TO THE EARLY 1990S (1996). The movement that made 
use of this approach the most was beyond doubt the one known as “Appropriation Art”. 
See APPROPRIATION (David Evans ed., 2009); EMPRUNTS ET CITATIONS DANS LE 
CHAMP ARTISTIQUE (Pierre Beylot ed., 2005). 
10  Several scholars have analyzed the intellectual property problems posed by 
appropriation art, in particular in the context of US copyright law as in the US, a certain 
number of copyright cases dealt with the delicate issue of what can be appropriated or 
not in the copyright context. See, e.g., Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: 
Puppies, Piracy and Post-Modernism, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT.L.J. 1, 23-33 (1992); 
Peter Jaszi, Is There Such A Thing As Postmodern Copyright?, 12 TUL. J. TECH. & 
INTELL. PROP. 105 (2009); Judith Bresler, Begged, Borrowed or Stolen: Whose Art is 
it Anyway? An Alternative Solution of Fine Art Licensing, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 
15 (2003); William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: 
An Economic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2000); Darren Hudson Hick, 
Appropriation and Transformation, 23 FORDAM INT. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 1155 
(2013); Jacqueline Morley, The Unfettered Expansion of Appropriation Art Protection 
by the Fair Use Doctrine: Searching for Transformativeness in Cariou v. Prince and 
Beyond, 55 IDEA 385 (2015); Amy Adler, Fair Use and the Future of Art, 91 NYU L. 
REV. 559 (2016). For a comparative approach, see Christophe Geiger, Freedom of 
Artistic Creativity and Copyright Law: A Compatible Combination?, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 101 (2018); André Lucas & Jane Ginsburg, Copyright, Freedom of Expression 
and Free Access to Information (Comparative Study of American and European Law), 
249 RIDA 5 (2016); Paula Westenberger, Cultural Palimpsests: Artistic Reuses in 
Brazil in the Context of Copyright and Human Rights (2018) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, Queen Mary University of London). 
11 According to one scholar, this could also be the result of the uncertain legal situation 
with regard to appropriation art, inducing self-censorship in the art world, see Adler, 
Fair Use and the Future of Art, supra note 10, at 566 (underlining that “the disparate 
results in these cases, not to mention the high costs of litigating against a backdrop of 
uncertainty, help explain why a climate of ‘self-censorship’ has taken hold in the art 
world”). See also Patricia Aufderheide et al., Copyright, Permissions, and Fair Use in 
the Visual Arts Communities: An Issues Report 5 (Feb., 2015), 
http://cmsimpact.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/fair_use_for_visual_arts_communities.pdf (stating that 
artists “pay a high price for copyright confusion and misunderstanding. Their work is 
constrained and censored, most powerfully by themselves, because of that confusion 
and the resulting fear and anxiety.”). 
12 Museums can in addition to the artists also be liable for copyright infringement, as 
an exhibition can be considered as an act of communication to the public. 
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entitled to a share of the fruits of that success. The second is when the 
appropriation harms the reputation of, or is contrary to the idea behind, the 
original work or is simply objected to by the original author. The latter occurs 
primarily in cases in which the derivative work contains a criticism of the 
primary work. Both factors were present in Klasen v. Malka, in which a fashion 
photographer brought an action against the painter for infringement of his 
copyright on the photographs in question. In justifying the appropriation, 
Klasen, a member of the artistic movement known as Narrative Figuration,13 
explained that the objective of his artistic approach was to use advertising 
images in his paintings to provoke reflection by the spectator, thereby putting 
the initial work in a new context and expressing something entirely new and 
unexpected. He emphasized that the photographs had been integrated into his 
work as symbols of excessive consumption. 
On the legal side, the painter raised in his defense a series of arguments 
ranging from the photographs’ lack of originality, the quotation, parody, and 
incidental use exceptions, and, finally, the freedom of artistic expression laid 
down in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
Although in the first instance the Paris District Court held in effect that the 
photographs lacked originality, 14  the Paris Court of Appeal overruled that 
decision, finding that the choices made by the photographer reflected genuine 
aesthetic decisions that were an imprint of the his personality as author and, 
consequently, that the photographs at issue were deserving copyright 
protection. 15  The parody, quotation, and incidental/accessory use exception 
defenses 16  were all rejected, which is unsurprising given the excessively 
restrictive interpretation of limitations that has traditionally prevailed in the 
French copyright system.17 The sole defense the painter had left was to claim 
that the use was legitimated by his right to freedom of artistic expression. 
However, the Court of Appeal dismissed that argument, holding that there was 
no higher public interest that would justify the rights of a derivative artist 
prevailing over those of an original work’s author. The court held that freedom 
                                                 
13 This movement often intends to give art a political dimension. On this art movement, 
see JEAN-LOUIS PRADEL, LA FIGURATION NARRATIVE (2008); SARAH WILSON, THE 
VISUAL WORLD OF FRENCH THEORY: FIGURATIONS (2010). 
14 Tribunal de Grande Instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, Jan. 
31, 2012, No. 10/02898 (Fr.). 
15 Cour d’appel [CA] [regional court of appeal] Paris, Pole 5, 1st Chamber, Sept. 18, 
2013, No. 12-02480 (Fr.). 
16 On this limitation for “accessory” use created in France by the judiciary without legal 
basis and allowing the reproduction or representation of a work when it is not the main 
subject and it is included in the “scenery” of a picture, see Christophe Geiger, Creating 
Copyright Limitations without Legal Basis: The “Buren” Decision, a Liberation?, 36 
INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 842 (2005). The limitation for incidental 
use is also foreseen in the Article 5(3)(i) of the InfoSoc Directive of 2001.  
17 For a criticism of this restrictive interpretation of limitations and exceptions often 
used by national courts or the CJEU, but which is not mandated by the copyright legal 
framework nor the rationale of copyright law, see Christophe Geiger & Franciska 
Schönherr, Limitations to Copyright in the Digital Age, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON 
EU INTERNET LAW 110 (Andrej Savin and Jan Trzaskowski eds., 2014); Christophe 
Geiger, Promoting Creativity through Copyright Limitations, Reflections on the 
Concept of Exclusivity in Copyright Law, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 515 (2010). 
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of expression can be limited to protect other individual rights and that the 
reworking of visual material in Klasen’s work could not reasonably permit him 
to ignore the rights of the original photographer. In other words, the Court of 
Appeal considered the photographer’s copyright to limit the painter’s freedom 
of artistic expression. 
Klasen appealed the decision, arguing that the limitation on his exercise of 
artistic expression was disproportionate in comparison with legislators’ 
objective and that the court ought to have assessed the proportionality of the 
infringement in light of the factual circumstances of the case rather than in an 
abstract manner18. The French Supreme Court supported his argument, and 
consequently reversed the Court of Appeal ruling based on Article 10 of the 
ECHR. The Supreme Court criticized the appellate judges for not having 
explained “in the specific case the manner in which the search for a fair balance 
between the rights at issue required the decision as pronounced” (emphasis 
added). With this simple sentence, the French Supreme Court finally put an end 
to a debate that had been raging for over 15 years on the application of 
fundamental rights in the intellectual property arena and, more precisely, on the 
manner in which a fair balance is to be struck between copyright and freedom 
of expression.19  
The aims of this chapter are to discuss the evolution in jurisprudential 
understanding in the EU, and more specifically in France, of the relationship 
between copyright and freedom of artistic expression and to analyze the courts’ 
                                                 
18 See also in this sense the Advocate General of the CJEU in his Opinion in Funke 
Medien NRW, supra note 8, [at 31]), stating that “any balancing of copyright against 
fundamental rights which goes beyond merely interpreting the provisions of copyright 
law, an exercise on the borderline between the interpretation and application of the law, 
must […] be carried out having regard to the circumstances of each individual case”, 
that is to say, on a case-by-case basis which is a standard approach of the human rights 
courts and ECtHR in particular. According to the Advocate General, “[t]hat case-by-
case approach enables the principle of proportionality to be applied as accurately as 
possible, thereby avoiding unjustified interferences with both copyright and 
fundamental rights.” (Id.) 
19 See generally P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Copyright and Freedom of Expression in Europe, 
in EXPANDING THE BOUNDARIES OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: INNOVATION POLICY 
FOR THE KNOWLEDGE SOCIETY 343 (Rochelle Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001); Alain 
Strowel & François Tulkens (eds.), DROIT D’AUTEUR ET LIBERTÉ D’EXPRESSION, 
REGARDS FRANCOPHONES, D’EUROPE ET D’AILLEURS (2006); Christophe Geiger, 
‘Constitutionalizing’ Intellectual Property Law? The Influence of Fundamental Rights 
on Intellectual Property in Europe, 37 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 
371 (2006); CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET DROIT DU PUBLIC A 
L’INFORMATION, APPROCHE DE DROIT COMPARE (2004). For an overview, drawing on 
the case law of the ECtHR and the CJEU, of the influence of the right to freedom of 
expression and information on European copyright law in the digital context, see Elena 
Izyumenko, The Freedom of Expression Contours of Copyright in the Digital Era: A 
European Perspective, 19 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 115 (2016). The debate about the 
admissibility of a case-by-case approach when evaluating the impact of a copyright 
restriction on freedom of expression has however been since revitalized by the CJEU 
in its 3 seminal decisions of 29 July 2019 (supra note 8), declaring inacceptable an 
external freedom of expression- assessment beyond the codified limitations in EU 
copyright law, in contradiction with the case-law of the European Court on Human 
Rights on this matter.  
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apparent acceptance of a sort of ‘fair use’ approach through the application of 
fundamental rights as external limitations to copyright law. The chapter is 
divided into three sections following this introduction. The first discusses the 
application of freedom of artistic expression to copyright law on a case-by-case 
basis, showing that, although long contested, such an approach is now mandated 
by the courts, thus significantly “flexibilizing” the legal framework in this area; 
the second is dedicated to finding a balance between fundamental rights and 
copyright, with particular attention paid to the weight the judiciary should afford 
freedom of artistic expression versus copyright in cases of creative 
appropriation; and the final section discusses and evaluates the growing need 
for legislative reform to render freedom of artistic expression fully compatible 
with copyright law in cases of creative reuse.  
 FAIR USE THROUGH THE APPLICATION OF FREEDOM OF ARTISTIC EXPRESSION 
TO COPYRIGHT ON A CASE-BY-CASE BASIS: A QUESTION (FINALLY) 
RESOLVED 
France was, surprisingly, one of the first countries in which first instance 
judges accepted an argument based on freedom of expression to limit copyright 
law beyond statutory limitations. In a highly debated decision rendered at the 
end of the 1990s by the Paris District Court20 in the Utrillo case, the judges 
decided, based on Article 10 of the ECHR, that it was permissible for a 
television channel to film a number of paintings by Maurice Utrillo when 
reporting on the opening of an art exhibition dedicated to the artist’s work, even 
if the use exceeded the scope of available exceptions to copyright in that case.21 
The court considered that showing some of the paintings was inevitable in 
communicating information about the art exhibition and that it would have been 
impossible for the channel not to use copyright-protected images when 
informing the public of the artist’s work.22 Interestingly, a specific limitation 
allowing this type of use for information purposes was later introduced, in 2006, 
in the French Intellectual Property Code23 during the implementation process of 
the Directive on the Harmonisation of Copyright in the Information Society of 
                                                 
20 Tribunal de Grande Instance (TGI). 
21 Tribunal de Grande Instance [TGI] [ordinary court of original jurisdiction] Paris, 3rd 
Chamber, Feb. 23, 1999, No. 98-7053 (Fr.). For a comment, see Pascal Kamina, Le 
droit du public à l’information peut-il justifier une exception au droit d’auteur?, 
RECUEIL DALLOZ 580 (1999). This was the case because of the excessively narrow 
interpretation of the quotation exception under the French law. More generally on this 
question see Christophe Geiger, Author’s Right, Copyright and the Public’s Right to 
Information, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 24 (Fiona Macmillan ed., 2007) 
(problematizing the relationship between the author and the recipient of information as 
it is enshrined in the freedom of expression and the right to information). 
22 Michel Vivant & Jean-Michel Bruguière, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET DROITS VOISINS 586 
n.1 (3rd ed. 2015). 
23 Code de la Propriété Intellectuelle [C. Propr. Intell.] art. L. 122-5 (Fr.), translation 
available at http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/fr/fr467en.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/HD7H-G9BP], introduced by law No. 2006-961 of 1 August 2006 
concerning copyright and neighbouring rights in the information society. On the scope 
of this new exception see Christophe Geiger, The New French Law on Copyright and 
Neighbouring Rights of 1 August 2006 - An Adaptation to the Needs of the Information 
Society?, 38 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 401 (2007). 
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2001 (the so-called InfoSoc Directive),24 but it was not available at the time of 
the Utrillo judgement.   
The case went up to the French Supreme Court, which disagreed with 
externally limiting copyright law through the application of ECHR Article 10, 
and held that because the legislature had already taken the balancing of 
fundamental rights into consideration when drafting the copyright law, going 
beyond that legislative equilibrium was not permissible.25 In other words, in the 
Supreme Court’s view, it is impossible to refer to freedom of expression as an 
external limitation to copyright because that fundamental right had already been 
internally acknowledged by legislators in drafting the list of exceptions laid 
down in the French Intellectual Property Code. The same approach was also 
followed by the Belgian Supreme Court in a judgment on September 25, 2003, 
in which it held in an abstract manner that “the freedom of expression 
guaranteed by Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights and by 
Article 19 of the International Treaty concerning Civil and Political Rights does 
not prevent the protection of a literary or artistic work by copyright.”26 
A number of scholars have rightly pointed out that this approach is not 
compatible with the European legal system and that a fair and proportionate 
application of fundamental rights requires an appreciation on a case-by-case 
basis, striking a balance between the specific rights at issue by means of a 
proportionality test.27 In parallel, a number of national judges in several EU 
countries have indeed embraced the possibility of restricting copyright beyond 
its internal limits, whether by relying directly on freedom of expression or by 
combining it with an existing copyright exception, thereby permitting a re-
evaluation of the limits of copyright protection in light of fundamental rights.28 
                                                 
24 Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 
on the Harmonisation of Certain Aspects of Copyright and Related Rights in the 
Information Society, 2001 O.J. (L 167) 10 [hereinafter InfoSoc Directive]. 
25 Cass. 1e civ., Nov. 13, 2003, Bull. Civ. I, No. 01-14385 (Fr.). For a comment, see 
Christophe Geiger, France: Intellectual Property Code, Art.L.122-5-3; European 
Convention on Human Rights, Art.10 – “Utrillo”, 35 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 716 (2004). 
26 Cass., 25 Sept. 2003, Auteurs et médias 2004, p. 29.  For a combined comment on 
the two rulings, see André Lucas, Droit d’auteur, liberté d’expression et “droit du 
public à l’information”, 2005 AUTEURS & MEDIA 13 (2005). 
27 Pascal Kamina, Droit d’auteur et Article 10 de la Convention européenne des droits 
de l’Homme, 25 Légicom 15 (2001); CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, DROIT D'AUTEUR ET DROIT 
DU PUBLIC À L'INFORMATION, APPROCHE DE DROIT COMPARÉ 391-408 (2004). More 
generally on the use of the proportionality test in copyright disputes, see Christophe 
Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Copyright on the Human Rights Trial: Redefining the 
Boundaries of Exclusivity through Freedom of Expression, 45 INT’L REV. INTELL. 
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 316 (2014). However, some scholars are very critical towards 
the introduction of the proportionality requirement within copyright law, see, e.g., 
Lucas & Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 78 (stressing with further references the “dangers 
of the proportionality test (…); they are particularly formidable in the field of copyright 
because the diversity of interest that the courts have to weight increases the need for 
subjective assessments, a situation which, in the European context, creates legal 
uncertainty that is harmful both for rightholders and users of works.”). 
28  See, e.g., the “Medienprofessor”- Case, Austrian Supreme Court 12 June 2001, 
[2002] GRUR Int. 341, 33 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 994; Hague 
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In some instances, even when the assessment of specific facts did not justify the 
legitimization of the use at issue, judges have still insisted on imperatively 
taking the facts of the case into account, stressing that an external conflict 
between freedom of expression and copyright can arise in certain 
circumstances. In Ashdown v. Telegraph Group, for example, the London Court 
of Appeal considered it “necessary for the court to look closely at the facts of 
individual cases” to accommodate fundamental rights because, under rare 
circumstances, the right of freedom of expression can “come into conflict with 
the protection afforded by the Copyright Act.”29 In the United States, where the 
fair use-exception allows considerably more flexibility than in the majority of 
European countries,30 the Supreme Court has held that there are circumstances 
in which a defense based on the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 
which protects freedom of speech, may be justified. In this respect, even though 
copyright is traditionally considered “categorically immune” to free speech,31 
the U.S. Supreme Court softened its position in Eldred v. Ashcroft,32 holding 
that copyright is only “generally immune to free speech,” thereby expanding the 
possibility of using freedom of expression as an limitation in exceptional 
circumstances. 
In Europe, in contrast, the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 
2009, has influenced the use of fundamental rights in the intellectual property 
area to a considerable extent,33 leading to an adjustment to judicial practice in 
multiple national jurisdictions. In effect, along with the Lisbon Treaty, the 
Charter of the Fundamental Rights of the European Union and all of its rights, 
freedoms, and principles have acquired the same legal value as the Treaties of 
the European Union,34 thus integrating the core of EU primary law. Therefore, 
national judges are required to interpret their internal laws in the light of the 
fundamental rights afforded by the EU system and, by means of a 
proportionality test, to ensure a fair balance between the rights in question.35 
                                                 
Court of Appeals, Church of Scientology v. XS4ALL, 4 September 2003, 6 AMI 222 
(2003); Supreme Court of the Canton of Zurich, Sept. 9, 2004, MEDIALEX 231 
(2004); German Constitutional Court, Germania 3, 29 June 2000, GRUR INT. 149 
(2001). 
29 See in particular Ashdown v. Telegraph Group Ltd. [2002] EWCA (Civ) 1142 (Eng.) 
(“Rare circumstances can arise where the right of freedom of expression will come into 
conflict with the protection afforded by the Copyright Act, notwithstanding the express 
exceptions to be found in the Act (…) This will make it necessary for the court to look 
closely at the facts of individual cases”.). 
30 In the context of Appropriation Art, see Morley, supra note 10. For a comparison 
with the situation in the EU, see Lucas & Ginsburg, supra note 10, at 32; Geiger, supra 
note 10, at 119.  
31 Harper & Row Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enterprise, 471 U.S. 539 (1985). 
32 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 28 (2003). 
33 Christophe Geiger, Intellectual “Property” after the Treaty of Lisbon, Towards a 
Different Approach in the New European Legal Order?, 32 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 
255 (2010). 
34 Treaty of European Union (TEU) art. 6(1), July 29, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191),  
35 Christophe Geiger, Copyright’s Fundamental Rights Dimension at EU Level, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE FUTURE OF EU COPYRIGHT 27 (Estelle Derclaye ed., 
2009); Dirk Voorhoof, Freedom of Expression and the Right to Information: 
Implications for Copyright, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 331 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2015); Bernd Justin Jütte, The 
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The CJEU has been very clear about this matter. In Promusicae v. Telefónica,36 
for example, the CJEU emphasized that EU law demands that member states 
pay extra attention when implementing directives 
…to rely on an interpretation of [directives] which allows a fair balance 
to be struck between the various fundamental rights protected by the 
Community legal order. Further, when implementing the measures 
transposing those directives, the authorities and courts of the Member 
States must not only interpret their national law in a manner consistent 
with those directives but also make sure that they do not rely on an 
interpretation of them which would be in conflict with those 
fundamental rights or with the other general principles of Community 
law, such as the principle of proportionality.37  
National judges are thus expected to interpret their own national legislation 
and review the scope of their jurisdiction’s exceptions to copyright in light of 
the fundamental rights that are affected. Nevertheless, in some cases such an 
interpretation might not be possible if no specific statutory exception is 
available. In these cases, judges must have direct recourse to a fundamental right 
as a legal basis to legitimate the use at hand and limit copyright “from the 
outside”. Such a situation is particularly likely to arise in EU countries where 
national intellectual property legislation does not take sufficient account of the 
fundamental rights in question, particularly where exceptions to copyright are 
constructed too narrowly. 
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) finally eliminated any 
remaining doubts about this subject in Ashby Donald. 38  In that case, the 
Strasbourg judges determined that a prohibition on the communication of works 
on the Internet, even in breach of copyright, might constitute a violation of 
freedom of expression. Hence, even in a situation in which there has been clear 
copyright infringement, it is always necessary to evaluate whether the resulting 
restriction to freedom of expression is “necessary in a democratic society” so as 
to strike a fair balance between the different rights at issue. After pointing out 
that “freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential bases of a 
democratic society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and the 
development of each individual,” the ECtHR confirmed that “it involves 
exceptions that in any event require a narrow interpretation, and the need to 
restrict it must be established convincingly.”39 The court thus made it clear that 
                                                 
Beginning of a (Happy?) Relationship: Copyright and Freedom of Expression in 
Europe, 38 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV.  11 (2016). 
36 Case C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v. Telefónica de 
España SAU, 2008 E.C.R. I-271, [2008] 2 CMLR 17. 
37 Id. ¶ 70. 
38 Ashby Donald v. France, App. No. 36769/08 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 10, 2013); see also 
the so called “Pirate Bay” decision (Neij & Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden, App. No. 
40397/12 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Feb. 19, 2013)). For a joint comment, see Geiger & 
Izyumenko, supra note 27. 
39 Ashby Donald v. France, App. No. 36769/08, ¶ 38 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Jan. 10, 2013). 
However, by refusing to take into account freedom of expression beyond the limited 
list of exceptions in EU copyright law, the CJEU contradicts this position (see supra 
note 8). It remains to see how this conflict between the approach of both courts will be 
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intellectual property rights must be interpreted as exceptions to freedom of 
expression and that, given the great importance of that freedom within the 
framework of a democratic society, judges need to be very careful indeed in the 
presence of a restriction, particularly when it comes to political and artistic 
speech.40 
Following these decisions at European level, the development of French 
case law seemed inevitable. Accordingly, perfectly in line with the ECtHR 
approach, the French Supreme Court in Klasen demanded that the Court of 
Appeal explain “concretely the manner in which the search for a fair balance 
between the rights in question required the decision that it rendered.”41 It is 
rather interesting to note that, at approximately the same time in the 
Netherlands, the Dutch Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in a 
remarkable judgment issued on April 3, 2015.42 In the case concerned, the 
Dutch Supreme Court criticized the Court of Appeal for deciding that copyright 
constitutes a limitation to the freedom of expression established in Article 10 of 
the ECHR and that only in exceptional circumstances can freedom of expression 
justify the use of a copyright-protected work beyond the internal limits imposed 
by law. The Court of Appeal had ruled that exceptional circumstances were not 
satisfied in the case at issue without explaining why. Hence, the Supreme Court 
reversed the decision, stating that the appellate court ought to have explained—
and verified in the specific case—the manner in which the restriction of freedom 
of expression was not only proportionate to achieve its results, but also 
necessary in a democratic society. 
                                                 
resolved, in particular in the light of the future pending accession of the EU to the 
European Convention on Human Rights. In any case, as it has been emphasized, it 
“raises the questions of the “constitutionality” of the Luxemburg Court’s position in 
the sense of its compatibility with the EU treaties and the fundamental rights order in 
the EU” (Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, The Constitutionalization of 
Intellectual Property Law in the E.U. and the Funke Medien, Pelham and Spiegel 
Online Decisions of the CJEU: Progress, But Still Some Way to Go!, supra note 8, at 
p. 301). 
40  In this sense, see Christophe Geiger, Fundamental Rights, a Safeguard for the 
Coherence of Intellectual Property Law?, 35 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & 
COMPETITION L. 268 (2004) (recalling that copyright has to be considered “as an island 
of exclusivity in a sea of freedom” (freedom of expression, freedom of competition)); 
Helle Porsdam, On European Narratives of Human Rights and Their Possible 
Implications for Copyright, in 6 NEW DIRECTIONS IN COPYRIGHT LAW 335 (Fiona 
Macmillan ed., 2007). 
41 Cass. 1e civ., May 15, 2015, Bull. Civ. 1, No. 13-27391 (Fr.). For a comment, see 
Christophe Geiger, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE 967 (2015).  
42 HR 3 april 2015, m.nt. EE (GS Media BV/Sanoma Media Netherlands BV and 
Others) (Neth.). See in particular para. 5.2.5 of the judgment. 
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 FAIR USE THROUGH FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS BALANCING: WEIGHING 
FREEDOM OF ARTISTIC EXPRESSION AND COPYRIGHT IN CASES OF CREATIVE 
APPROPRIATION  
 Finding a fair balance between copyright and freedom of artistic 
expression in national courts: towards the legitimization of creative 
reuses of copyrighted works 
Two highly influential decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court of 
Germany (BVerfG) also pertain to the issue of creative appropriation and 
deserve a brief examination here. In Germania 3 and Metall auf Metall, the 
BVerfG gave important guidance on how to balance copyright and freedom of 
artistic expression. Germania 343 concerned a playwright, Heiner Müller, who 
had extensively quoted, in italics, from the work of Bertolt Brecht in his play 
entitled Germania 3. The dispute was brought to the constitutional court, which 
decided that the use of four pages in total of quoted material from Brecht did 
not constitute an infringement of copyright because the quotation in question 
was part of a new creative and artistic work. The BVerfG further stated that 
legal understanding of the quotation exception needs to be expanded and 
interpreted more extensively to guarantee the protection of artistic freedom.44 
In addition, it reinforced the notion that copyright exceptions have to be read in 
the light of such freedom to strike a balance between various interests.45  
The highly commented-upon case of Metall auf Metall46 centered on the 
                                                 
43 Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court], June 29, 2000, 
3 GRUR INT. 149, § 22 (2001) (Ger.). For non-official English translation, see 
Elizabeth Adeney & Christoph Antons, The Germania 3 Decision Translated: The 
Quotation Exception Before the German Constitutional Court, 35 EUR. INTELL. PROP. 
REV. 646 (2013). 
44 In paragraph 27 of the decision, the BVerfG clarified that the great mistake of the 
court of appeal was that it “gives no particular artistic weight to how it is worked into 
the drama and its position in the play”. See Adeney & Antons, supra note 43. 
45 See Adeney & Antons, supra note 43 (“The Court states that ‘the prohibition placed 
on the quotation of these two passages represents [the complainants allege] a crude 
attack on the integrity of Heiner Müller’s art work and therefore also on Art 5(3) of the 
Basic Law’ [freedom of art]”); for more decisions that contest the lack of flexibility of 
the copyright system, see Hugenholtz and Senftleben, supra note 1, (stating that in 
Germania 3  the Court “held that […] the quotation right deserves broad application 
with respect to artistic works. Authors must, to a certain degree, accept that works of 
art gradually enter the public domain. Copyright exemptions should be interpreted 
accordingly, and reflect a balancing of relevant interests. In the case at hand, the Court 
considered, the commercial interests of the copyright owner should give way to the 
user’s interest in providing artistic commentary”.). 
46 Federal Constitutional Court, First Senate, Metall auf Metall, 31 May 2016, 1 BvR 
1585/13 (Ger.). For the press release in English, see Federal Constitutional Court, The 
Use of Samples for Artistic Purposes May Justify an Interference with Copyrights and 
Related Rights (May 31, 2016), 
https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2016/b
vg16-029.html. For a comment, see Ines Duhanic, Copy This Sound! The Cultural 
Importance of Sampling for Hip Hop Music in Copyright Law - A Copyright Law 
Analysis of the Sampling Decision of the German Federal Constitutional Court, 11 
GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT INTERNATIONALER TEIL 
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hip-hop song “Nur Mir,” which sampled a continuously repeating two-second 
rhythm sequence from “Metall auf Metall,” a composition by the famous 
German band Kraftwerk. The Federal Court of Justice (BGH) initially 
considered the sampling to be an infringing use, and held that the takeover of 
even the smallest part of a musical composition constituted interference with 
the rights of the phonogram producers if the reproduction was intended to sound 
like the original composition.47 The BGH also held that simply appropriating a 
music sample without adding one’s own version of it falls outside the limit of 
free use that could have legitimized the appropriation.48 The BVerfG, however, 
reversed this decision, ruling that the courts have to search for a fair balance 
between protecting the property interests of phonogram producers and 
protecting the freedom of artistic creativity to ensure that the latter is not 
disproportionally affected. The constitutional judges also held that the 
presumption that the inclusion of any sound sequence in a work interferes with 
the phonogram producers’ rights affords no attention to artistic freedom, and 
hence is unsuitable for seeking a fair balance between the interests involved.49 
Finally, the BVerfG ruled that submitting sampling to the authorization of the 
                                                 
[GRUR INT.] 1007 (2016); Marc D. Mimler, “Metall auf Metall” - The German Federal 
Constitutional Court Discusses the Permissibility of Sampling Music Tracks, 7 QUEEN 
MARY J. INTELL. PROP. 119 (2017); Neil Conley & Tom Braegelmann, Metall auf 
Metall: The Importance of the Kraftwerk Decision for the Sampling of Music in 
Germany, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1017 (2009); Mathias Leistner, Die “Metall 
auf Metall”-Entscheidung des BVerfG - Oder: Warum das Urheberrecht in Karlsruhe 
in Guten Händen ist, 8 GEWERBLICHER RECHTSSCHUTZ UND URHEBERRECHT [GRUR] 
772 (2016); Rupprecht Podszun, Postmoderne Kreativität im Konflikt mit dem 
Urheberrechtsgesetz und die Annäherung an “Fair Use”, Zeitschrift für Urheber- und 
Medienrecht 606 (2016). 
47 See the two decisions in this case by Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of 
Justice] Nov. 20, 2008, Case I ZR 112/06, Metall auf Metall I, translated in Neil Conley 
& Tom Braegelmann, Metall auf Metall: The Importance of the Kraftwerk Decision for 
the Sampling of Music in Germany Part III: Case Translation, 56 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y 
U.S.A. 1017, 1034 (2009); and BGH Dec. 13, 2012, Case I ZR 182/11, Metall auf 
Metall II, translated in AF, Germany: “Metall auf Metall”, 48 INT’L REV. INTELL. 
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 343 (2017). 
48  Gesetz über Urheberrecht und verwandte Schutzrechte [Urheberrechtsgesetz] 
[UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept. 9, 1965, BGBL. I § 24 (Ger.). The free use (“Freie 
Benutzung”) limitation permits the author to freely exploit a work created on the basis 
of another work, provided that “the personal characteristics of the first work are lost in 
the derived work.” Detailed on Article 24 of the German Copyright Act, see Duhanic, 
supra note 46; VERONIKA FISCHER, DIGITALE KUNST UND FREIE BENUTZUNG, 
SYSTEMATISIERUNG UND FLEXIBILISIERUNG (2018). From an international 
perspective, see Paul Edward Geller, A German Approach to Fair Use: Test Cases for 
TRIPs Criteria for Copyright Limitations?, 57 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 553 (2010). 
See also Urheberrechtegesetz [UrhG] [Federal Law on Copyright in Works of 
Literature and Art and on Related Rights] Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch [BGBL] No. 
111/1936, § 5(2) (Austria).  
49 Overall, the BVerfG stated that “if the freedom of art development interferes with the 
rights of phonogram producers only slightly, the interests of the latter should bend in 
favour of the freedom of art,” as translated in Chenguo Zhang, ‘Sampling’ is Freedom 
of Art: The German Federal Constitutional Court Deliberates on the Acceptability of 
Music Sampling in the ‘Metall auf Metall’ Case, 33 COMPUTER L. & SEC. REV. 870, 
871 (2017). 
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right-holder would potentially restrict free artistic activity and cultural 
development, thereby creating a degree of legal uncertainty for artists50.  
The German Constitutional Court thus demonstrated far-sighted 
comprehension of musical development and the particularities of different 
music styles, as subjecting a use to the exclusive right of phonogram producers 
would render the use of past sound recordings far more difficult in the future.51 
Both of these BVerfG decisions demonstrate the court’s serious concern for the 
need to safeguard freedom of artistic expression when developing new musical 
styles and to determine how a proportional and fair balance must be sought 
between this fundamental right and the protection of intellectual property 
rights.52 The court also clearly acknowledged the fragility of artistic freedom in 
the copyright context in these cases, and seemed to recommend that national 
courts exercise caution when dealing with cases involving creative reuses of 
copyrighted works.  
In the Netherlands, the Hague Court of Appeal also had an opportunity to 
render a judgment in a 2011 case concerning a conflict between design rights 
and freedom of artistic expression.53 The Danish painter Nadia Plessner had 
portrayed an African child holding a Louis Vuitton bag to draw attention to the 
woeful manner in which the Western media was treating the humanitarian crisis 
in the Darfur region of Sudan, affording more attention to celebrity gossip than 
to the ongoing genocide (the painting, entitled Darfurnica, also made reference 
                                                 
50 Note however, that the same case went back to the German Federal Supreme Court, 
which submitted it on 4 August 2017 to the CJEU for Opinion. As it concerns freedom 
of artistic creativity in particular at issue, the Advocate General Szpunar came to a 
different conclusion than the German Constitutional court, considering that, as the EU 
law stands now, (unlicensed) music sampling should be regarded as a violation of the 
exclusive rights of phonogram producers and, consequently, as not covered by the 
“essence” of the right to freedom of expression and freedom of the arts. According to 
the Advocate General, such stance of EU law towards music sampling and artistic 
creativity in general might change in the future, but this is the step for the EU 
legislature, not the Court, to undertake (see Opinion of Advocate General Szpunar in 
Pelham and Others [at 98]). In its “Pelham” decision, thethe Court of Justice is more 
nuanced, as is allows sampling if it is non-recognisable, and considers further that the 
quotation exception could potentially cover recognisable, but “dialogic” use of the 
original work, subject to certain other conditions (see supra note 8). The exclusion 
however of an external “freedom of art”-review remains problematic from a 
fundamental rights perspective. detailed in this sense see C. Geiger, Freedom of Artistic 
Creativity and Copyright Law: A Compatible Combination?, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. 
REV. 413 (2018). 
51 On further discussion on music sampling and mash-ups, see Bernd Justin Jütte & H. 
Maier, A Human Right to Sample—Will the CJEU Dance to the BGH-Beat?, 12 J. 
INTELL. PROP. L. & PRACT. 784 (2017); More generally and on user-generated contents 
and the enabling of a legal mashup culture, see Bernd Justin Jütte, The EU’s Trouble 
with Mashups: From Disabling to Enabling a Digital Art Form, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. 
INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 172 (2014). 
52 Surprisingly, in the case of music, on the other side of the Atlantic the flexible Fair 
use defense seems to have been rarely successful in cases of non-parodic uses. See 
detailed on the issue Edward Lee, Fair Use Avoidance in Music Cases, 59 B.C.L. REV 
(forthcoming 2018). 
53 Rb.’s-Gravenhage, 4 May 2011, IER 2011, 39 m. nt. W. Sakulin (Plesner/Louis 
Vuitton) (Neth.). 
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in its structure and title to Picasso’s famous Guernica), prompting the luxury 
fashion house to bring an action for infringement of its design rights on the 
depicted bag. The Hague Court found in favor of the artist on the basis of 
freedom of artistic expression, holding that the luxury product depicted in the 
artwork in this concrete case was being used as a vehicle to express a critical 
political view endowed with great social significance and, accordingly, that 
freedom of expression should prevail.54  
All of these important cases clearly demonstrate that intellectual property 
law is not weakened when freedom of expression is prioritized. On the contrary, 
the intellectual property system actually gains legitimacy when exclusive rights 
are not used to prevent artistic activities and criticism in the form of art.55 
Moreover, important safeguards exist, most notably the proportionality test 
conducted to prevent abusive uses of freedom of expression by litigants. It goes 
without saying that in the Klasen case discussed above, free artistic expression 
would have been impeded if a prior obligation had been imposed on the painter 
to contact the owner of the original photographs to ask for permission for the 
intended use. It is also highly unlikely that the photographer would have been 
willing to grant such permission, particularly if the artist had explained that his 
photographs had been chosen to illustrate and criticize the superficiality of the 
fashion world and the excesses of a consumption-based society! In addition to 
these practical difficulties, it must be noted that it is not always easy to identify 
the rights-holder in the case of photography, as photographers (particularly 
when they work for magazines) often assign their rights to third parties. 
Therefore, placing the burden of locating rights-holders on the authors of 
derivative works imposes very high transactional costs.  
In fact, it is difficult to imagine Andy Warhol requesting permission from 
the rights-holder of the Campbell trademark before producing his famous 
Campbell’s Soup Cans with the intention of mocking American consumer 
society. Or indeed Marcel Duchamp seeking permission from the potential 
holders of the design rights on the ready-mades he displayed as works of art. Or 
Jeff Koons asking for the consent of the creators of advertisements to make use 
of their posters as a way of scorning the messages they wished to communicate. 
More generally, would it really have been reasonable to require Pablo Picasso—
and the many other artists who subsequently adapted his work—to ask Édouard 
Manet’s heirs for permission to paint his version of the Le Déjeuner sur l’herbe 
(a painting whose composition incidentally derived from an engraving by 
Marcantonio Raimondi, an engraving that was itself based on a drawing by 
Raphael)? Numerous similar examples can be drawn from the annals of art 
history.56 In a 2007 case, the French Supreme Court had an opportunity to 
                                                 
54 See on this case Jani McCutcheon, Designs, Parody and Artistic Expression - A 
Comparative Perspective of Plesner v Louis Vuitton, 41 MONASH UNIV. L REV. 192 
(2015); Lucie Guibault, The Netherlands: Dafurnica, Miffy and the Right to Parody!, 
2 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COM. L. 236 (2011). 
55 For a fundamental reflection on this, see the fascinating work of GIANCARLO FROSIO, 
RECONCILING COPYRIGHT WITH CUMULATIVE CREATIVITY: THE THIRD PARADIGM 
(2018) (examining the long history of creativity in order to demonstrate disparity 
between cumulative mechanics of creativity and modern copyright policies, and 
proposing options to reconcile both). 
56 Only the visual arts are mentioned here, but this exercise could easily be transposed 
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demonstrate the sensitivity of such questions, and did not hesitate to base its 
decision on freedom of artistic expression in permitting the publication of a 
sequel to Les Misérables, despite an attempt to prevent it by the heirs of Victor 
Hugo based on the perpetual moral rights of the renowned writer.57  
Decisions based on fundamental rights reasoning are becoming increasingly 
frequent in EU member states, and it is thus anticipated that the importance of 
seeking a fair balance between copyright and freedom of artistic expression will 
soon be recognized and affirmed by a majority of Europe’s highest courts. 
Moreover, the use of a proportionality test seems to be the means envisioned by 
the courts in all of the aforementioned rulings for achieving a fair such balance 
in light of the factual circumstances of each case. Therefore, it seemed clear that 
the claim that the conflict between copyright and freedom of expression has 
been internalized and that no judicial review beyond the existing exceptions is 
possible belonged to the past. However, as we have noted previously, the CJEU 
in 2019 has taken a conflicting position, so that this debate has now been revived 
in the EU. Moreover, acknowledgement of the relevance of striking a fair 
balance between the interests at stake by several of the highest courts in EU 
member states has still not translated into general application by courts of lower 
instance. Such resistance to change is clearly illustrated by developments 
subsequent to the Klasen decision in France.  
 Resistance to change: the Koons v. Bauret-decisions and judgement 
of remittal in Klasen 
As previously discussed, applying the principle of proportionality in 
copyright cases has the potential to legitimize freedom of artistic expression in 
diverse situations of creative appropriation.58 However, a number of trial judges 
in France have continued to support a more restrictive approach despite the 
Klasen decision by the French Supreme Court in 2015. The Paris District Court 
judgment, which was later confirmed by the Paris Court of Appeal, in Koons v. 
Bauret and remittal decision of the Versailles Court of Appeal in Klasen are 
exactly such cases. As these decisions were the first to apply in concreto 
balancing and use of the proportionality test, as mandated by a correct 
application of fundamental rights in the context of appropriation art, they are 
worthy of detailed analysis. Furthermore, they are also important for a general 
assessment of this art form from a copyright perspective at the national and 
international levels.   
1. The judgment of the Paris District Court on March 9, 2017 in 
Koons v Bauret 
Koons v. Bauret 59  centered on a postcard featuring a black-and-white 
                                                 
to all kinds of art, from music, to cinema, to literature, etc. 
57 Cass. 1e civ., Jan. 30, 2007, Bull. Civ. I, No. 125 (Fr.). For a summary of the case in 
English, see D.W., Copyright Law: France - Victor Hugo II, 38 INT’L REV. INTELL. 
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 736 (2007). For a comment, see Christophe Geiger, 
Copyright and the Freedom to Create – A Fragile Balance, 38 INT’L REV. INTELL. 
PROP. & COMPETITION L. 707 (2007). 
58  See Christophe Geiger, Freedom of Artistic Creativity and Copyright Law: A 
Compatible Combination?, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 101 (2018).    
59 Tribunal de Grande Instance [TGI] [Paris District court of first instance] Paris, 3rd 
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photograph of two naked children holding hands, taken in 1970 by Jean-
François Bauret, that the American artist Jeff Koons had used as inspiration in 
1988 in designing the porcelain sculpture Naked as part of his “Banality” series. 
The photographer’s heirs brought an action for copyright infringement against 
Koons and the Centre Pompidou,60 arguing that the sculpture reproduced the 
protected photograph in full. Koons did not contest that argument, even though 
he had added additional elements not present in the original photograph to the 
sculpture (such as the colored base with flowers and small flower bouquet held 
by the boy) and cited numerous other sources of inspiration. Many arguments 
were brought forward as part of the defense, the main one being that the use was 
legitimated by freedom of artistic expression as protected by Article 10 of the 
ECHR. A liberal reading of the existing exceptions in EU law, particularly of 
the right of quotation, would probably have justified the use in question, thus 
permitting recognition under French law of artistic quotation in the context of a 
creative reuse of copyright in the interest of protecting artistic discourse. 
However, because the French courts traditionally have a very narrow 
understanding of the quotation exception, Article 10 of the ECHR seemed like 
the best means of legitimating the use under French copyright law.61     
The Paris District Court welcomed the argument that Article 10 protects 
freedom of artistic creativity and clarified that assessing the facts on a case-by-
case basis is required to guarantee a fair balance between copyright and freedom 
of expression. This stance was clearly a consequence of the aforementioned 
Klasen decision, with which the court complied. However, in appreciation of 
the particularities of the case, and after making a clear reference to fundamental 
rights balancing mechanisms, the court came to the conclusion that the creative 
use in question should not be allowed, as Koons had failed to justify the 
imperative necessity of using Bauret’s photograph without seeking the 
photographer’s prior authorization.  
Although the decision can be criticized, it must be noted that it shows real 
progress, as French courts in the past had frequently limited their analysis to an 
abstract appreciation of the conflict between copyright and freedom of 
expression, an approach that is not compliant with the method required to 
balance fundamental rights. An example of this lack of appreciation of the 
particularities of each concrete case can be seen in the Klasen decision reached 
by the Appellate Court of Paris.62 The court considered, without any further 
                                                 
Chamber, Succession Bauret c. Jeffrey Koons et le Centre national d’art et de culture 
Georges Pompidou, March 9, 2017, No. 15-01086 (Fr.). For a comment see Jean-
Michel Bruguière, 348 LEGIPRESSE 177 (2017); Jean-Michel Bruguière, 64 PROPR. 
INTELL. 69 (2017). The Paris Court of Appeal in a decision of Dec. 17, 2019 (No. 
152/2019, 75 PROPR. INTELL. 96 (2020), comment J.-M. Bruguière) simply confirmed 
the decision of the Paris District court and the factual assessment by the first instance 
judges without much argumentation, far from a proper proportionality analysis required 
by article 10 ECHR. Therefore, the following developments will concentrate on the 
Paris district court decision, not on the Appeal decision. 
60 In fact, the work of art in question was part of the catalogue of an art exhibition 
devoted to Koons in 2014 by Centre Pompidou. 
61 On the (very contestable) restrictive interpretation of exceptions by Courts at national 
level, in particular in France, see supra Part I of the chapter. 
62 CA Paris, Pole 5, 1st Chamber, Sept. 18, 2013, No. 12/02480. 
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explanation, the copyright protection of the photograph as imposing a limit on 
the painter’s freedom of expression and, as a result, rejected the defendant’s 
argument based on such freedom, as “the rights in the alleged infringing work 
could not, without a higher interest, outweigh the rights of the works from which 
they were derived.” 63  The decision was eventually reversed by the French 
Supreme Court, resulting in the remittal of the case to a lower instance court for 
an assessment of the concrete facts therein, thus effecting a clean break with 
previous case law holding that any argument based on a violation of Article 10 
of the ECHR that went beyond the scope of existing exceptions should be 
considered invalid.64 
Returning to Koons v. Bauret, the Paris District Court began its justification 
of its ruling by highlighting that, according to the ECtHR, the weight to be 
afforded the right to freedom of expression is intrinsically linked to the type of 
discourse used in the given circumstance (political speech enjoying greater 
protection than commercial speech). The judges considered it necessary to 
ascertain whether the situation concerned the reuse of copyright for commercial 
intent or for a higher public interest purpose in order to properly measure the 
impact on that fundamental right.65 In fact, as discussed above, making such a 
distinction is a very important step when striking a fair balance between the 
rights at stake, as it permits appreciation of the effects of an eventual restriction 
on freedom of artistic creativity. It remains evident, nevertheless, that the 
appropriation at issue was not exclusively a form of commercial expression, 
which would be the case, for example, in the case of an advertising campaign.66 
As rightly emphasized by the court, and also in full alignment with the reasoning 
of the ECtHR,67 the fact that Jeff Koons earns money from his art does not lead 
to the conclusion that his artistic creations have a commercial purpose.68 
However, the court surprisingly reversed the burden of proof based on its 
understanding that for freedom of expression to outweigh property rights, the 
interest being protected must be legitimate and proportional to the ends being 
achieved and the benefit of a democratic society. This seems to be an incorrect 
understanding of how ECHR Article 10 is to be applied in copyright cases. 
Under the rationale of that article, the order in which the burden of proof is 
                                                 
63 CA Paris, Pole 5, 1st Chamber, Sept. 18, 2013, No. 12/02480. 
64 French Supreme Court, 1st Civil Chamber, 13 Nov. 2003, supra note 25; For a critical 
comment, see Geiger, supra note 23. 
65 TGI Paris, Mar. 9, 2017, No. 15-01086 (Fr.). 
66 Case C-71/02, Herbert Karner Industrie-Auktionen GmbH v, Troostwijk GmbH, 
[2004] E.C.R. I-03025, ¶ 51 (“When the exercise of the freedom does not contribute to 
a discussion of public interest and, in addition, arises in a context in which the Member 
States have a certain amount of discretion, review is limited to an examination of the 
reasonableness and proportionality of the interference. This holds true for the 
commercial use of freedom of expression, particularly in a field as complex and 
fluctuating as advertising (see, to that effect, Case C-245/01 RTL Television [2003] 
ECR I-12489, paragraph 73; judgments of the ECHR of 20 November 1989, Markt 
intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beermann, Reports of Judgments and Decisions series 
A No 165, paragraph 33; and of 28 June 2001, VGT Verein gegen Tierfabriken v 
Switzerland, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 2001 -VI, paragraphs 69 to 70).”). 
67 See Geiger & Elena, supra note 2, at 31. 
68 In the same sense, the mere fact that a newspaper is sold to its readers does not 
amount to a commercial expression. 
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analyzed is inverted. Because in this case it was the enforcement of the 
copyright on the photograph that resulted in the restriction of the American 
artist’s freedom of artistic creativity, it should have been left to the 
photographer, not the creator of the artistic reuse, to prove that the restriction 
was indeed necessary and imperative for the benefit of a democratic society. It 
is evident that freedom of expression holds a privileged position in the EU legal 
system, and should thus be seen in the context of artistic creativity as a principle 
from which copyright protection departs.69  
The court continued its analysis by assessing the justification given by 
Koons for his use of the specific photograph concerned. Neither the argument 
that the creative reuse was made with the intention of reflecting upon society 
nor that Koons’ artistic expression had gained a high degree of public 
acceptance would have been rejected by the court as long as the artist had 
succeeded in proving that he had conveyed a new and enriching message that 
would contribute to the development of contemporary art. However, the court 
considered that the artist had failed to explain in a sufficiently concrete manner 
the necessity of using the two children in the photograph concerned to spread 
his message. It seems, in fact, that the court penalized Koons both for his failure 
to explain why he could not have designed the work differently and for making 
use of a number of details depicted in the photograph.  
The former part of the court’s decision is of great importance, as the judges 
essentially required the artist to provide a convincing justification of his creative 
process. However, neither the argument concerning the particularities of the 
artistic movement of which the work of art was a part nor the description of the 
aim of the individual sculpture or series of sculptures was evaluated with the 
attention it deserved. Instead, the Paris judges came rather close to judging the 
artistic merits of the sculpture in question, and even the pertinence and 
legitimacy of the art movement to which Koons belongs. Indeed, by asking the 
artist to justify his creative choices, the judges seemed to be assessing his art 
rather than limiting themselves to matters of law.70 It is extremely difficult to 
evaluate “why an artist could not have done the work of art differently” without 
entering an area outside legal discourse. This sort of appreciation exceeds a 
mere request for further information concerning an artistic process of creation.71 
                                                 
69 See more detailed Geiger & Izyumenko, supra note 27. 
70 Sharing this concern, see Edouard Treppoz, Retour sur la dénaturation contextuelle 
du Dialogues des Carmélites Comment on Cass. 1re civ., 22 June 2017, G. Bernanos et 
a. c/ D. Techerniakov, Bel Air Media et a., 352 LÉGIPRESSE 438, 440 (2017) 
(emphasizing the need “for a fruitful dialogue between the art world and the legal world 
(...). In the world of art, it is important to analyse the works in question so that the judge 
can take this analysis into consideration when qualifying the work. In the same sense 
that a judge is not a technical expert in patents, requiring the help of an expert, the 
judge is also not an art specialist, which justifies the use of experts in the field”. 
Therefore, this author concludes that the judge has to make his/her decision taking into 
account the artistic analysis that is subjected to him/her.). 
71 It is conceivable that Jeff Koons might even unable to explain how the use of this 
particular photograph was necessary for the creation of the work in question. It is 
possible to imagine that the use of this photograph was so obvious for the artist, in such 
a way that is not even possible for him to explain the reasons behind this obviousness. 
To ask an artist to expose or to dissect his creative reasoning and thus to justify his 
inspiration as to allow judges to appreciate it seems a very problematic step to us, as 
21 “FAIR USE” THROUGH FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS IN EUROPE 
 
CHRISTOPHE.GEIGER@CEIPI.EDU 
In any case, it is clear that imposing the burden of proof on an artist in this 
manner entails a strong risk of interfering in the artistic process, potentially 
leading to a denial of the artist’s intellectual and creative freedom. Therefore, 
judges should be extremely prudent in their rulings when asking for artistic 
justifications. 72 That said, in an a contrario interpretation, it could also be 
deduced that the photograph’s reuse might have been deemed legitimate by the 
court if Koons had been better able to explain the necessity of that reuse. 
In Koons v. Bauret, the Paris District Court also made use of another 
surprising element in establishing the primacy of the photograph’s copyright 
over the derivative work, that is, the fact that it is essential for the public to have 
knowledge of the primary work in order for the appropriated work to provoke 
reflection in spectators. Because the photograph was unknown to the general 
public, such reflection was not possible in this case. The judges thus introduced 
a distinction between works that are well known, which can easily be 
appropriated in a lawful manner, and unknown works, for which such a 
possibility cannot be recognized. Such a distinction is difficult to justify.73 It is 
also contrary to the rationale of the appropriation art movement, whose aim is 
to cast light on forgotten, outdated, and kitsch works, as well as on any other 
image or cultural material of a particular time and place that is not expected to 
be an object of commercial exploitation (for example, a 1970s-era postcard 
bought at a second-hand shop or flea market or a limited advertising campaign). 
It thus seems that the Paris court mixed up the requirements of the parody 
exception, for which a reference to the original work is of major importance, 
with those of artistically creative re-appropriation, which is protected under 
Article 10 of the ECHR74. 
In fact, the court reached the surprising conclusion in this case that the artist 
                                                 
this sort of appreciation is definitely outside any legal scope. 
72 This was also the position of United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit 
in the Cariou v. Prince-  decision, considering that creative appropriation by Richard 
Prince of the photographs by Patrick Cariou was covered by the fair use exception. 
Cariou v. Prince 714 F. 3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013). The Court was of the opinion that Cariou 
had not to justify his creative choices: “What is critical is how the work in question 
appears to the reasonable observer, not simply what an artist might say about a 
particular piece of work. Prince’s work could be transformative even without 
commenting on Cariou’s work or on culture, and even without Prince’s stated intention 
to do so,” id. at 707. Commenting on this passage, see Lucas & Ginsburg, supra note 
10, at 46 (“[T]he Court’s refusal to require artists to explain themselves is certainly 
compatible with freedom of expression. Artist are not critics- no more than judges are- 
and the copyright law should let their works speak for themselves.”). 
73 In this sense, see also Bruguière, supra note 59, at 72 n.63 (“Why works of art that 
are unknown should enjoy a supplementary protection in comparison to well-known 
works?”). 
74 This same surprising argument was re-used by the Paris Court of First instance (TGI) 
in a decision of 8 November 2018, Koons and Centre Georges Pompidou vs Davidovici 
(No. 15/02536), in which it was considered that Jeff Koons had infringed the copyright 
of a photographer when using the image of an advertisement campaign as a point of 
departure for one of his sculptures. The court found no violation of Article 10 ECHR 
and no disproportionate restriction of the artist’s freedom of artistic expression, as no 
artistic dialogue was possible since the original work was unknown and thus considered 
that the artists just wanted to spare a creative effort. 
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had used the photograph for personal reasons, that is, to avoid having to be 
creative himself. Accordingly, it concluded that such use should not have been 
made without the authorization of the photograph’s author and the owner of the 
copyright on the postcard on which it appeared. The judges seemed to imply 
that Koons had run out of inspiration and wanted to save himself the effort of 
creating something new. As previously noted, this conclusion fails to 
understand the process behind creative appropriation in which the core of a new 
work is based on an existing work of art. Such appropriation is the creative act 
(or at least a part of it), and without it the work would lose its raison d'être. 
Once again, a cautious approach is needed if we are to avoid having the courts 
define what is or is not a work of art deserving of copyright protection. 
Assessing the elements that justify a restriction on freedom of artistic expression 
would have sufficed for the case in question to have arrived at a very different 
outcome. Moreover, the court completely failed to identify the interests of 
Bauret’s heirs and those of Jeff Koons and to strike a fair balance between their 
interests and the public interest. Further, no evidence was provided by the 
deceased photographer’s heirs to justify the imperative need to prohibit the 
public display of Koon’s sculpture. Such a prohibition would not only deprive 
French spectators of access to a major piece of art by a renowned 20th-century 
artist, but would also prevent the artist from publicly conveying his artistic 
message. 
2. Decision to remit Klasen to the Versailles Court of Appeal  
The decision on the Klasen case by the Versailles Court of Appeal on March 
16, 201875 raises the same concerns and reservations about implementation of 
the proportionality test in assessing freedom of artistic expression on a case-by-
case basis in copyright cases. The Versailles Court deemed the use of the 
photographs included in Klasen’s painting to be illegal76 based on the two rather 
surprising arguments also used by the Paris District Court in Koons v. Bauret. 
First, the court stated that it was up to Peter Klasen, who had invoked his 
freedom of expression in defense, to establish the extent to which a fair balance 
between the protection of his rights and those of the original work’s right-holder 
should be sought to justify his failure to obtain authorization for use of that 
work. Second, because of that failure, 77  the court considered that Klasen’s 
unauthorized use of the photographs in question had not been indispensable for 
the exercise of freedom of expression he was claiming. As previously noted, 
this reversal of the burden of proof can be contested under Article 10 of the 
ECHR, which establishes that the burden of proof rests with the party seeking 
to restrict such freedom and who, for that purpose, needs to demonstrate that 
                                                 
75 CA Versailles, 1e ch., Mar. 16, 2018, No. 15/06029. For comments, see Jean-Michel 
Bruguière, LA SEMAINE JURIDIQUE, Mar. 16, 2018, at 513; Valérie-Laure Benabou, 
DALLOZ IP/IT, 2018, at 300; Christophe Caron, COMM. COM. ÉLECTR, 2018, comm. 
32; Pierre Noual, REVUE LAMY DROIT DE L'IMMATÉRIEL 5193 (2018). For further a 
comment in English, see Eleonora Rosati, Not Sufficiently ‘Transformative’ 
Appropriation of a Photograph Held Infringing by French Court, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. 
L. & PRAC. 525 (2018). 
76 On the facts of the case, see in length supra Part I. 
77 On the contrary, the artist even confirmed that the primary work was perfectly 
capable of being substituted by any other advertising photographs of similar kind for 
achieving the same means. 
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the restriction is imperative and not disproportional. Klasen explained 
sufficiently well that his rationale for using the photographs was to expose how 
cultural materials convey a message about consumer society. In fact, the use of 
advertisements has long been the core of pop culture and, more generally, of 
contemporary art. Nevertheless, in the eyes of the court, this justification was 
not sufficient. It held that the painter had failed to explain exactly why he had 
chosen these particular photographs, even though his explanation made it clear 
that the appropriated material was part of his creative process, if not the heart 
of his artistic speech. As previously emphasized, such a position taken by the 
courts risks diminishing the artistic choices that artists should have in exercising 
their creative freedom.  
The Versailles Court then proceeded to analysis of a scholarly position78 put 
forward by the defendant concerning the legal treatment of appropriation art, 
and arrived at the unexpected conclusion that photographs that are not well 
known to the public cannot serve as the substrate of such art. This reasoning 
brings to mind the Paris District Court’s decision in Koons v. Bauret,79 in which 
the court held that a primary work had to be known to the public to be used as 
an object of artistic appropriation. As Valérie-Laure Benabou has pointed out, 
the judges in these two cases seemed alarmingly interested in assessing the 
merits of particular works of art, which has traditionally been considered 
undesirable when it comes to copyright, as judges are not to play the role of art 
critics.80 This is exactly what judges are doing when court decisions consider 
artistic appropriation legitimate only if the derivative work makes use of a well-
known primary work.81 Prof. Benabou emphasized that using notoriety as a 
yardstick to measure the level of protection a work of art deserves is rather 
odd.82 In reality, it is not the notoriety of a piece of art that might permit its 
appropriation, but rather the artistic reasoning behind that appropriation. If this 
stance had been adopted in the two aforementioned cases, the uses would 
undoubtedly have been deemed permissible. 
 BEYOND FAIR USE: RENDERING FREEDOM OF ARTISTIC EXPRESSION FULLY 
COMPATIBLE WITH COPYRIGHT PROTECTION THROUGH LEGISLATIVE REFORM 
The French Supreme Court’s decision in Klasen and other national high 
court decisions applying freedom of artistic expression to limit intellectual 
                                                 
78  Interestingly, the passage discussed in the ruling of the Court of Appeals was 
extracted from the comments on the decision of the French Supreme Court written by 
the author of this chapter. See Christophe Geiger, comment on the decision of the 
French Supreme Court, 15 May 2015, supra note 3, at 1623.  
79 TGI Paris, Mar. 9, 2017, No. 15-01086 (Fr.). 
80  This fear had already been voiced in 1903 by Justice Holmes in Bleistein v. 
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903) (“it would be dangerous 
undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of 
the worth of pictorical illustrations, outside the narrowest and most obvious limits. At 
the one extreme some works of genius would be sure to miss appreciation.”). See also 
Greenberg, supra note 10, “[I]t is apparent that judges could misconstrue the 
requirement and deny copyright protection to controversial or innovative works. The 
requirement does not operate as an incentive for artists to create, but rather discourages 
new forms of creation.”). 
81 Benabou, supra note 75, at 301. 
82 Id. at 302. 
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property rights have confirmed that the judiciary always needs to adopt a case-
by-case approach, even if the use in question lies outside the scope of an 
exception. However, as we have seen, the debate is not entirely closed as the 
CJEU decided that  limiting copyright beyond the admitted catalogue of 
exceptions laid out in the InfoSoc Directive is incompatible with EU law.83 The 
recent position of the CJEU risks relaunching another (no less fundamental) 
discussion on the necessary space devoted to freedom of artistic expression 
within copyright law, thereby encouraging EU legislators to intervene by 
exempting certain uses for creative purposes from the scope of protection for an 
exclusive right. Could such an exemption be achieved by expanding the legal 
understanding of the existing list of exceptions (specifically, the coverage of 
quotation and parody) to cover creative appropriations? In fact, the wording of 
the InfoSoc Directive84 is in many respects considerably more flexible than that 
of many national laws, as the right of quotation was drafted at the EU level as 
an open concept. It could thus very well allow an assessment of the facts on a 
case-by-case basis.  
Another possibility would be the creation of an entirely new creative use 
exception to copyright, such as that implemented in Canada 85  in 2012. 
Although, as we have seen, the question of allowing the creative use of 
copyright-protected content remains an extremely sensitive topic in Europe, 
Canadian legislators did not hesitate in resolving the problem by creating a 
specific exception for “content not commercially generated by the user.” Thus, 
according to Article 29.21 of the Canadian Copyright Act, “it is not an 
infringement of copyright for an individual to use an existing work or other 
subject-matter or copy of one, which has been published or otherwise made 
available to the public, in the creation of a new work or other subject-matter in 
which copyright subsists” provided that a certain number of criteria are fully 
satisfied. The most important criteria are the non-commercial nature of the 
derivative work and “the absence of a substantial adverse effect, financial or 
otherwise, on the exploitation or potential exploitation” of the first work, 
“including that the new work or other subject matter is not a substitute for the 
existing one.” 86 Although these criteria carefully limit permitted uses, their 
                                                 
83 CJEU, 29 July 2019, “Funke Medien”, “Pelham”, and “Spiegel Online”, supra note 
8. The decisions were rendered upon the request of the Bundesgerichtshof (Federal 
Supreme Court), Request for a preliminary ruling, Pelham GmbH and others, Case C-
476/17. For a discussion, see European Copyright Society, Opinion of the European 
Copyright Society in Relation to the Pending Reference before the CJEU in Case C-
476/17, Hutter v Pelham, 
https://europeancopyrightsocietydotorg.files.wordpress.com/2018/03/opinion-metall-auf-
metall-fin4.pdf (lasted visited January 16, 2019). In his Opinion on this case, the Advocate 
General Szpunar considers that an external limitation is only admissible in “exceptional 
circumstances” when the “essence of a fundamental right” is at stake, but estimates that 
unlicensed music sampling is not covered by the “essence” of the right to freedom of 
expression and freedom of the arts (Opinion in Pelham and Others, supra note 8, [98]). 
For a comment see Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Freedom of expression as 
an external limitation to copyright law in the EU: The Advocate General of the CJEU 
shows the way, supra note 8. 
84 InfoSoc Directive, art. 5.3(d). 
85 Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42, s. 29.21 (Can.). 
86 Id. ss. 29.21 (1)(a) and (d) respectively. 
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reading gives the impression that they will be difficult to implement. In reality, 
the distinction between commercial and non-commercial use is not always easy 
to draw, and the absence of an important adverse effect on the exploitation of 
the first work is subject to a diversity of interpretations. In this respect, one 
might recall the endless discussions generated by the condition laid down by 
international law87 that an absence of conflict with the normal exploitation of a 
work is necessary for a copyright exception to be permitted.88 Such a condition 
also seems to be reflected in the wording proposed by the Canadian 
legislature.89 At the same time, however, the condition90 also reminds us of one 
of the four factors that need to be considered in the fair use- defense framework 
according to U.S. copyright law, namely, the influence of the proposed creative 
use on the potential market for the protected work.91 
One might well wonder which of the foregoing solutions is the most worthy 
of adoption. Without embarking on in-depth analysis of Canadian copyright 
law,92 it could be pointed out that the exception in Article 29.21 of the Canadian 
Copyright Act constitutes an attempt to internalize the conflict between freedom 
of expression and copyright within a particular legislative provision. Thus, the 
Canadian approach responds directly to certain commentators’ preoccupation 
                                                 
87 Namely the second condition of the three-step test, “provided that such reproduction 
does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work”. 
88 Specifically Art. 9.2 of the Berne Convention (for the right of reproduction), Art. 13 
of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS 
Agreement)(for all property rights) and Arts. 10 and 16 of the WIPO treaties on 
Copyright (WCT) and Performing Rights and the Rights of producers of Phonograms 
(WPPT), laying down the so-called three step test. See on this question Christophe 
Geiger et al., The Three-Step-Test Revisited: How to Use the Test’s Flexibility in 
National Copyright Law, 29 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 581 (2014); See also Christophe 
Geiger, The Role of the Three-Step Test in the Adaptation of Copyright Law to the 
Information Society, UNESCO E-COPYRIGHT BULLETIN, Jan.-Mar. 2007 , available at 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0015/001578/157848e.pdf.  
89 Which however has not prevented certain commentators from arguing that Art. 29.21 
does not respect the criteria imposed by international law. See on this question Peter Yu, 
Can the Canadian UGC Exception Be Transplanted Abroad?, 26 INTELL. PROP. J. 175 
(2014) (putting forward very serious arguments in favour of the compatibility of the 
provision with the three-step test). 
90 On the conditions for the fair use defense in copyright matters, see Bernd Justin Jütte, 
The EU's Trouble with Mashups: From Disabling to Enabling a Digital Art Form, 5 J. 
INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. E-COM. L. 172 (2014). 
91 Art. 107 of the American 1976 Act. It must be noted that in the Campbell v. Acuff 
Rose judgment, the Supreme Court held that the re-use of a chorus from the song 
“Pretty Woman” by a hip-hop group parodying the famous song by Roy Orbison 
constituted fair use, holding that the fourth criterion was not necessarily the most 
important and that all the criteria should be applied in the light of the objective pursued 
by copyright, namely the promotion of progress in science and useful arts. Campbell v. 
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994). The lawful use for creative purposes was 
thus admitted despite the fact that this was a “commercial” use, mainly because the 
work was of a “transformative” nature. 
92 See, in particular, amongst the many commentaries, Theresa Scassa, Acknowledging 
Copyright's Illegitimate Offspring: User-Generated Content and Canadian Copyright 
Law, in THE COPYRIGHT PENTALOGY: HOW THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA SHOOK 
THE FOUNDATIONS OF CANADIAN COPYRIGHT LAW 431 (Michael Geist ed., 2013). 
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with the multiplication of conflicts outside copyright law, i.e., in the field of 
fundamental rights or competition law. However, such internalization through 
the implementation of a new exception for uses made for creative purposes is 
not a new idea.93 In fact, it was clearly considered to be a potentially viable 
option by the European Commission 94  a good decade ago, and was also 
envisaged as a possibility by the European Parliament in a resolution dated July 
9, 2015.95 In the same spirit, a group of European academics working on the 
European Copyright Code project proposed the adoption of a general clause 
covering all uses justified by freedom of expression that are not provided for by 
existing EU legislation.96 Recently, scholars have proposed to implement a new 
use privilege for User-Generated Content which combined with the obligation 
to pay equitable remuneration would satisfy all requirements of international 
copyright law such as the three-step test and create a new revenue streams for 
creators97. Other more classical options have also been considered. In France, 
for example, the “Lescure” report suggested the development of existing 
                                                 
93 More generally, the idea that copyright, through the many exceptions that it includes, 
already regulates within itself all the conflicts that could oppose it to other rights, is 
moreover advanced to dismiss the idea that such conflicts can be taken into account 
outside the legal provisions. But, who can seriously believe in a legislature that has 
foreseen everything? For this reason, the Advocate General of the CJEU has recently 
admitted that there are exceptional circumstances that justify an external limitation of 
copyright through fundamental rights, while still considering that “in the normal 
scheme of things, the internal limits on copyright make it possible to reconcile, in a 
satisfactory way overall, fundamental rights and freedoms with the exclusive rights of 
authors as regards the use of their works”. See Opinion in Case C-469/17, Funke 
Medien, supra note 8, Par. 40. On this issue see detailed Christophe Geiger & Elena 
Izyumenko, Freedom of expression as an external limitation to copyright law in the 
EU: The Advocate General of the CJEU shows the way, supra note 8. 
94 Green Paper of the Commission of the European Communities, Copyright in the 
Knowledge Economy, COM 466 (2008). 
95 European Parliament Resolution of 9 July 2015 on the implementation of Directive 
2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the 
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and related rights in the information 
society P8_TA-PROV(2015)0273, in which the European Parliament “notes with 
interest the development of new forms of use of works on digital networks, in particular 
transformative uses, and stresses the need to examine solutions reconciling efficient 
protection that provides for proper remuneration and fair compensation for creators 
with the public interest for access to cultural goods and knowledge” (Paragraph 42). 
For a comment, see Christophe Geiger et al., The Resolution of the European Parliament 
of 9 July 2015: Paving the Way (finally) for a Copyright Reform in the European Union? 37 
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 683 (2015). 
96  The Wittem Project: European Copyright Code, art. 5.2 (April 2010), 
http://www.copyrightcode.eu. See in particular Thomas Dreier, The Wittem Project of a 
European Copyright Code, in CONSTRUCTING EUROPEAN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: 
ACHIEVEMENTS AND NEW PERSPECTIVES 292 (Christophe Geiger ed., 2013). 
97 See Martin Senftleben, User-Generated Content – Towards a New Use Privilege in 
EU Copyright Law, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DIGITAL 
TECHNOLOGIES, 136 sq (Tanya Aplin, ed., 2020); Joao Pedro Quintais, COPYRIGHT IN THE 
AGE OF ONLINE ACCESS, ALTERNATIVE COMPENSATION SYSTEM IN EU LAW, 2017 (in particular 
Chapter 6, p. 365-406), and from the same author: Rethinking Normal Exploitation: 
Enabling Online Limitations in EU Copyright Law, AMI - tijdschrift voor auteurs-, media- 
en informatierecht 2017/6, pp. 197-205.   
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exceptions (the quotation and parody exceptions in particular) as a way to “ease 
the conditions in which the protected works can be reused in order to create 
derived works and to distribute them within a non-commercial framework”98 
while still complying with InfoSoc Directive.99 
Whatever solution is adopted, it would be desirable to increase the flexibility 
of and role granted to freedom of artistic expression within copyright law to 
better adapt legal provisions to the factual circumstances of various art 
movements. The failure of copyright law to take sufficient account of 
fundamental values such as freedom of expression ultimately risks the rejection 
of the entire system by creators and the general public alike if no appropriate 
solution is implemented.100 In this context, the argument put forward by several 
scholars that flexible exceptions are not within the continental tradition, and risk 
increasing legal uncertainty, is not convincing as numerous other open norms 
can be found in continental legal systems.101 Moreover, the uncertainty that an 
open provision can generate should not be overestimated. Even in the United 
States, whose copyright system is often presented as difficult to predict owing 
to the fair use clause, empirical studies over the past decade have shown that 
the solutions adopted by the courts can be forecast in most cases, largely 
disproving certain preconceived ideas on the matter.102 The fact that more than 
40 countries worldwide have adopted open clauses within the copyright 
arena,103 and that many of those countries boast flourishing cultural industries, 
                                                 
98 PIERRE LESCURE, MISSION «ACTE II DE L’EXCEPTION CULTURELLE», CONTRIBUTION AUX 
POLITIQUES CULTURELLES A L’ERE NUMERIQUE 36 (2013). 
99 The Directive in fact proposes the right of quotation as an open concept, permitting 
an assessment on a case-by-case basis (Art. 5.3 d requires the use to be “in accordance 
with fair practice, and to the extent required by the specific purpose”). This is very 
close to a “fair use” condition. In this line, some scholars have actually defended 
recently the idea that the right of quotation as included in international copyright law 
is very similar to a “fair use” provision. See the interesting chapter by Tanya Aplin & 
Lionel Bently, Displacing the Dominance of the Three-Step Test: The Role of Global, 
Mandatory Fair Use, in this volume. 
100  See in this sense Christophe Geiger, Reconceptualizing the Constitutional 
Dimension of Intellectual Property: An Updatein INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND 
HUMAN RIGHTS 117 sq (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 4th ed. 2020). 
101 For example, the French author’s right tradition often accommodates itself very well 
with open concepts. As an example, the extremely subjective criterion of originality is 
frequently the source of uncertainty, often making it impossible to know in advance if 
a work will be protected by copyright or not (it is then necessary to wait for the judge 
to make a decision, often at the end of very long proceedings; see on this question 
Vivant & Bruguière, supra note 22, at 260; these authors also ask whether originality 
is not an “elusive concept”, id. ¶ 258. Open norms constitute the special feature of any 
law that claims to be dynamic and adaptable. Continental civil laws are full of it, far 
beyond the field of copyright, see CÉLINE CASTETS-RENARD, NOTIONS À CONTENU 
VARIABLE ET DROIT D'AUTEUR (2004). 
102 Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012); Barton Beebe, An 
Empirical Study of U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978-2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
549 (2008); Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537 
(2009). 
103 For the list of these countries and their legislation, see Jonathan Band & Jonathan 
Gerafi, The Fair Use/Fair Dealing Handbook (Mar. 2015), http://infojustice.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/fair-use-handbook-march-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/489F-
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should serve to mitigate concerns and definitively permit a different view 
concerning open-ended clauses to limit copyright. However, the mere transplant 
of a U.S.-type fair use provision would admittedly not be ideal, as the copyright 
systems on the two sides of the Atlantic, despite certain convergences,104 remain 
different in scope and spirit.105 Thus, as has been recently proposed, a more 
promising way forward—and one that is more compatible with the EU legal 
system—might be to codify the criteria already used by judges when balancing 
fundamental rights and copyright law and introduce a European fair use 
provision based on freedom of expression in the EU acquis in addition to the 
existing list of exceptions.106     
More fundamentally, it might be necessary to think ahead and carry out a 
more in-depth review of the mechanism of exclusivity in the context of a 
derivative creation, even if doing so means considering other options for the 
remuneration of a work’s original authors.107 This fascinating, albeit complex, 
issue is beyond the scope of this chapter. Whatever solution is adopted, it must 
necessarily guarantee that copyright (and, more generally, intellectual property 
law) cannot under any circumstances be misused for the purpose of censorship, 
regardless of whether the expression in question has political, cultural, or artistic 
intent.108 All in all, one thing appears quite obvious: it can hardly be considered 
compatible with free artistic creativity in a democratic society to demand that 
artists seek authorization before creating a new work.   
 
                                                 
MYUK]. 
104 See Gillian Davies, The Convergence of Copyright and Authors’ Rights – Reality or 
Chimera?, 26 INT’L REV. INTELL. PROP. & COMPETITION L. 964 (1995).  
105 See in this sense Paul L.C. Torremans, The Perspective of the Introduction of a 
European Fair Use Clause, in CODIFICATION OF EUROPEAN COPYRIGHT LAW: 
CHALLENGES AND PERSPECTIVES 319 (Tatiana-Eleni Synodinou ed., 2012). 
106 See detailed for such a proposal Christophe Geiger & Elena Izyumenko, Towards a 
European “Fair Use” Grounded in Freedom of Expression,35 Am. U. Int’l L. Rev 1–
74 (2019) . 
107 See on this issue Christophe Geiger, Les limites au droit d’auteur en faveur de la 
création dérivée, in COPYRIGHT AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE 
ALAI STUDY DAYS 338 (2008); Christophe Geiger, Promoting Creativity through 
Copyright Limitations, Reflections on the Concept of Exclusivity in Copyright Law, 12 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 515 (2010); Christophe Geiger, Statutory Licenses as 
Enabler of Creative Uses, in REMUNERATION OF COPYRIGHT OWNERS, REGULATORY 
CHALLENGES OF NEW BUSINESS MODELS 305 (Kung-Chung Liu & Reto M. Hilty eds., 
2017). See Christophe Geiger, Freedom of Artistic Creativity and Copyright Law: A 
Compatible Combination?, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 101 (2018) (advocating a “limitation 
based”-statutory remuneration system for commercial creative uses, administrated by 
an independent regulation authority which could solve ex post disputes between 
original and derivative creators on the price to be paid for the transformative use via 
mediation, taking into account the existing and expected revenue streams for the 
derivative work).   
108 For a reflection in this sense in order to redesign copyright as an access right, see 
Christophe Geiger, Copyright as an Access Right, Securing Cultural Participation 
through the Protection of Creators’ Interests, in WHAT IF WE COULD REIMAGINE 
COPYRIGHT? 73 (Rebecca Giblin & Kimberlee Weatherall eds., 2016). 
